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Solving the Matchmaking Dilemma between Companies and External 
Idea Contributors 
Harland, Peter and Ann-Marie Nienaber  
Most of the innovation management literature refers to the benefits of external 
knowledge. It follows then that companies invest a great deal of effort and 
resources in developing instruments to motivate people to submit ideas; however, 
external contributors are often not willing to submit their ideas because they are 
afraid that they will not be compensated for them afterwards. Thus, the question 
arises as to how companies can profit from the good ideas of external 
contributors without being accused of intellectual property theft in cases where it 
already knows about the ideas being presented. For this paper we have taken the 
findings from trust research into account and discuss several practical methods 
for overcoming the obstacles that arise when both companies and idea 
contributors want to profit from ideas. Finally, we develop a trust-based 
intermediary model for knowledge transfer in the innovation management field. 
Keywords: trust; matchmaking process; collaborative innovations; external ideas; 
intermediary; online platforms. 
1.   Introduction 
Acquiring external ideas and knowledge is becoming increasingly necessary for the 
global success of companies. However, despite the fact that ideas and knowledge are 
considered to be important for future strategic development, many businesses cannot 
afford huge R&D departments. The significant benefits gained from external knowledge 
can be found in the current literature on this topic (Phelps et al., 2012). In line with this, 
many companies are very interested in concepts like innovation competition, 
crowdsourcing, and netnography (Brabham, 2008; Chesbrough, 2003; Galbraith and 
McAdam, 2013) and are investing a great deal of effort and financial resources in 
developing instruments to motivate people to submit ideas to companies as well as in 
collaborative innovations. For example, Proctor and Gamble has reached its target of 
  
acquiring over 50% of its ideas from external sources; in order to highlight the 
attractiveness of these activities, they claim that the projects enabled by their 
‘connect&develop’ initiative achieved a 70% higher net present value than in average 
projects in 2009 (P&G).  
However, with regard to incentive theories (e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 2001), 
the literature also states that external idea contributors are often not willing to submit 
their ideas without receiving compensation or some other reward. Thus, the number of 
people that submit new ideas to companies has decreased considerably. In addition, 
there is great concern regarding intellectual property theft because of previous bad 
experiences. Usually, external idea contributors submit ideas that cannot be taken from 
a patent without the company’s guarantee that it will be handled in a transparent, 
confidential and trustworthy manner. They do not know if the company is already aware 
of their findings or whether or not it wants to use a specific idea. Furthermore, some 
companies pretend to be interested in buying ideas from sources outside the company; 
in the end, however, they do not compensate the contributors. Consequently, intellectual 
property theft has become a real obstacle to building mutually beneficial relationships 
and long-term collaborations. As a result, successful matchmaking between an idea 
contributor and a company has become less likely. In this paper, ‘matchmaking’ is 
defined as all of the social interactions between two or more parties from the first 
intention to the matching decision regarding the conditions of an idea transfer or the 
decision to stop a specific interaction (see also Katzy et al., 2013).  
For a successful matchmaking process, people have to trust that companies will 
behave in a fair and honest way. Otherwise, they will no longer be willing to submit 
ideas to organisations. Even though many idea generators often think that companies 
pretend to be trustworthy, we have found numerous examples of businesses that behave 
  
fairly and honestly. Generally speaking, however, people do not want to accept this fact. 
In many cases, the ideas that are submitted to companies are already known to the 
company; therefore it stands to reason that a company would not be willing to reward 
those ideas. Thus, a successful matchmaking for both parties in this type of situation is 
also very unlikely. Still, it is almost impossible to convince external contributors that 
this behaviour on the part of the business makes sense. Thus, idea contributors remain 
suspicious of companies and are afraid of being treated unfairly and dishonestly. This 
situation could have a negative influence on how companies are perceived and result in 
no longer having access to an important source of new ideas.  
Thus, the question arises as to how companies can organise the matchmaking 
process in a way that allows them to profit from good ideas that are acquired from 
external sources without being accused of intellectual property theft in cases where the 
company already knows the idea being presented.  
While the use of intermediaries (third parties) is already well known in other 
research fields (for an overview see Howells, 2006), literature is still lacking on whether 
using intermediaries to handle external ideas and knowledge has a positive effect (Katzy 
et al., 2013). We assume that intermediaries could overcome the obstacles to knowledge 
sharing between external idea contributors and companies if they stand to profit from 
the new ideas in the short as well as long term. Using an intermediary can have a 
positive effect in two ways: First, the idea contributor views the intermediary as a 
trustworthy person; second, the intermediary also provides protection against 
intellectual property theft. It is precisely for this reason that we present a specific 
intermediary who is characterised by a high level of trustworthiness, i.e. both – 
companies and idea contributors – can trust him. This trustworthy intermediary supports 
the idea exchange process between both parties so that the company and idea 
  
contributor are able to profit from each other in the end. In particular, companies that 
have an open innovation strategy use external ideas extensively to discover and realise 
innovative opportunities. In order to receive more and better quality ideas, firms cannot 
only rely on their traditional suppliers. They have to be open to new partners 
(Chesbrough, 2003) and develop a professional approach to matchmaking. In the 
following sections, we demonstrate how the entire matchmaking process of submitting, 
presenting and perhaps selling an idea can be seen as mutually beneficial for idea 
contributors and companies. The design of our trust-based intermediary model is based 
on the findings of studies in the area of new institutional economic theory as well as 
social exchange theory. This is combined with the findings from the field of 
intermediaries in innovation management, especially in the area of knowledge transfer 
processes. In order to find evidence for our assumption, we conducted a comprehensive 
qualitative analysis of German DAX companies. We looked at different coordination 
mechanisms, problem-solving marketplaces, online platforms and speculative 
applications to gain an understanding of the individual motivations in the matchmaking 
process. 
The paper is organised as follows: First, we refer to the well-known mechanics 
of the new institutional theory and combine the findings in this area with the field of 
trust research and the social exchange theory in particular. Second, we conducted a 
qualitative analysis of the incentives and processes involved in matchmaking between 
an external idea contributor and a company. Based on our findings, we present an 
intermediary model called the trust-based intermediary process, which could be a way 
to overcome the typical obstacles that arise in matchmaking. Finally, we discuss our 
results and provide concluding remarks on the implications of our findings for business 
and research. 
  
2.  Trust research findings and the role of innovation intermediaries in 
knowledge transfer processes     
This paper takes the findings from two main research streams into account: (1) 
the findings from the trust research field based on the new institutional theory and the 
social exchange theory, and (2) the findings from the innovation knowledge transfer 
process literature with regard to the role of intermediaries.   
Following the structure mentioned above, the paper first discusses the main 
theories in trust research, i.e. the new institutional theory, especially with regard to the 
cooperation problem in relation to social dilemmas and the social exchange theory. 
Social dilemma generally describes a two-person game situation, which can be played 
only once (Taylor, 1987; Elster, 1989). Originally, the story for this dilemma involves 
two prisoners who are interviewed in two different rooms at the same time concerning 
their criminal act. If both prisoners deny their criminal act, they both go to prison for 
one year. If one of the prisoners tells the truth and the other denies the criminal act, the 
prisoner that tells the truth is freed, while the other goes to prison for five years. If both 
prisoners tell the truth, they both go to prison for four years. Thus, both prisoners 
benefit the most from this dilemma if they both deny the criminal act and trust each 
other for this purpose. Otherwise, neither of them would deny the criminal act.  
This decision-making process is one example of a social dilemma. A social 
dilemma can generally be observed in the matchmaking process of external idea 
contributors and companies. The simple case describes one external idea contributor 
(person) who wants to offer his idea to a company. In return, he expects to profit from 
his idea, usually by receiving money from the company. Furthermore, the external idea 
contributor does not have to pay money for a patent. The issue here is that the external 
idea contributor does not know if the company can be trusted. In the worst case 
scenario, the company profits from the idea without paying any money to the external 
  
contributor. At the same time, however, the company also does not know if the idea 
contributor can be trusted. For example, he may be offering the company an idea that is 
already known or to other companies at the same time. Thus, the company and 
contributor are both trying to determine each other’s credibility. In the end, both 
partners would profit most if they do not cooperate, which results in a social dilemma.  
In the literature, many researchers describe trust as an exchange in which clear 
rules and control mechanisms are defined (Kirchgässner, 1991) in order to solve social 
dilemmas. Trust can be understood as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other person will perform a particular 
action that is important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the 
other party (Mayer et al., 1995). Carneval (1995) says that trust plays a major role in the 
reduction of social complexity. In situations where different actions are possible, 
complexity arises because there are usually many more paths of action than could 
possibly be followed (Luhmann, 1979). Trust, as the expectation that a company will 
behave in a trustworthy manner, reduces this complexity. According to the theory of 
perceived risk, trust results from a combination of the trustor’s perceived uncertainty 
concerning the possible opportunistic behaviour on the part of the trusted entity, and the 
perceived meaning of the consequences (Rousseau and Sitkin, 1998; Martin and 
Camarero, 2008). In this way, trust enables action despite the perceived risks and is 
often the basis for the formation of social relations, e.g. between an external idea 
contributor and a company (Lai et al., 2013; Bachmann, 2000; Martin and Camarero, 
2008). This is also supported by findings in the area of social exchange theory, which 
show that cooperative rather than individualistic motives prevail (Larrick and Blount, 
1995). While individualists try to maximise their own outcome with no regard for the 
other party’s gains or losses, cooperators aim at maximising their own outcome in 
  
combination with the outcome of the opposing negotiator, where social motives are 
partly rooted in individual differences (e.g. De Dreu and Van Lange, 1995). 
Furthermore, proponents of the social exchange theory claim that cooperatively 
motivated negotiators reach a greater number of integrative, win-win agreements in the 
short term as well as the long term and possibly for the entire life cycle of the 
organisation (e.g. De Dreu, Giebels, and Van der Vliert, 1998; Weingart, Bennet, and 
Brett, 1993).  
At this juncture, it is very important to point out that trust is not seen as a 
substitute for control. Many researchers understand trust and control as two very 
important aspects of a trustful and sustainable relationship. Strong control systems can 
‘inhibit the development of trust’ (Mayer et al., 1995), however the two should not be 
seen as mutually exclusive (Schoorman et al., 2007) but rather as a ‘duality’ (Möllering, 
2006). To some extent, control and trust can be seen as complementary. In Lewicki & 
Bunker’s (1996) model, there is no need for monitoring at the highest stage of trust. 
However, most work relationships never reach that stage or form a basis for a real life 
cycle of collaborative innovations. At the lower stages as well as in the initial contact 
between the external idea contributor and the company, the elements of trust and control 
are still being established and need to be carefully balanced. One way to reach such a 
balance is through the sharing and delegation of control, which in turn increases 
managerial trustworthiness (Whitener et al., 1998). In this paper, we focus on the 
coordination mechanisms necessary to support mutual trust between idea contributors 
and companies in the matchmaking process.   
The coordination mechanisms described refer to the findings on the role of 
intermediaries in the innovation process (Howells, 2006) as a third research stream. 
While researchers often differentiate intermediaries as either organisations or processes 
  
(Howells, 2006), in our paper we refer to an intermediary as a process that is managed 
by a person or organisation to achieve a balance between trust and control. While 
Pilorget (1993) describes intermediaries as innovation consultancy firms, Hargadon and 
Sutton (1997) talk about technology brokering. In our context, the definition given by 
Wolpert (2002) is the most fitting. The author defines intermediaries as knowledge 
brokers who facilitate the information exchange between companies with regard to 
innovation. Here, we would replace the information exchange between companies with 
the information exchange between a company and an idea contributor with regard to an 
idea. The two tasks that an intermediary usually carries out are ‘scanning information’ 
and ‘communicating’ (Lynn, 1996; Wolpert, 2002). Other studies specify these tasks by 
focusing on individual technologies that help intermediaries to transfer ideas between 
companies (Turpin et al. 1996, Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Hargadon, 1998). In our 
study, the intermediary can be seen as the person or organisation that scans the 
information given by the idea contributor and the company and that manages the 
communication process between both parties. Similar adaptations of the intermediary 
model can be also found by Seaton and Cordey-Hayes (1993) or Bessant and Rush 
(1995). With regard to the different types of intermediation in the innovation process 
that are described in Howells (2006), we refer to the types called gatekeeping and 
brokering.   
However, the functions of intermediaries in the literature are widely spread and 
sometimes very different, especially when we take the findings of internet marketplaces 
and the role of intermediaries into account (see e.g. Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2008). The 
internet has made it much more feasible and cheaper for firms to open themselves up to 
a wide range of external sources for innovative ideas. Thus, we see explosive growth in 
the area of open innovation intermediary networks, such as LinkedIn or ResearchGate, 
  
which offer companies the option of finding and collecting knowledge from a wide 
range of internet users, such as individuals, companies and knowledge brokers 
(Billington and Davidson, 2012). However, the challenges of successful matchmaking 
between an idea contributor and the target company still exist and have become even 
more challenging on the internet. Relationships on the internet are characterised by a 
high level of anonymity (for an overview, see Urban et al., 2009), which makes it more 
difficult to enhance trust and build long-term relationships (Wang and Emurian, 2005). 
Trust, however, still remains a basic requirement for matchmaking in innovation 
processes (e.g. Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). The main problem 
with the internet appears to be the lack of personal contact, which usually plays an 
important role in determining a company’s trustworthiness (McKnight et al., 2002). 
Hence, insufficient trust is considered to be the main reason preventing the internet 
sector from developing even more quickly and extensively (Beatty et al., 2011; Jordan 
and Ingram, 2011).  
In combining the findings from both theory streams, we try to overcome the 
challenges and obstacles that arise in the matchmaking process when transferring an 
idea from an idea contributor to a target company. While the social dilemma describes 
the general problem that two parties have in trusting each other when they both want to 
profit the most from a specific transfer, the findings of the intermediary theory in 
innovation management are seen as a way of overcoming this problem. In this case, the 
intermediary is considered a trustworthy third party by both parties involved in the 
knowledge transfer process. We do not want to say that the parties simply have to trust 
each other because developing and enhancing trust takes a very long time and requires a 
great deal of effort (Morgan and Hunt, 1995). Instead, we understand trust as a 
mechanism that is needed to manage the social dilemma, however, without neglecting 
  
the importance of control mechanisms. This is underscored by the findings on trust in 
online intermediaries. Without any contact, it is even more difficult to develop and 
establish trust between two parties. Thus, the aim of our research is to develop a trust-
based intermediary model that is able to overcome the obstacles that arise between an 
idea contributor and a company in the knowledge transfer process.  
3.   Data and Method 
For a better understanding of the interaction that takes place between idea 
contributors and companies in the matchmaking process in terms of figuring out if the 
partner’s idea is of strategic relevance, we conducted a comprehensive qualitative 
content analysis. We used the method originated by Krippendorf (1980), which 
combines the following two approaches: inductive category development and deductive 
category application. We followed the typical steps of a qualitative content analysis and 
identified the different matchmaking processes currently used in business management 
for transferring an idea from a contributor to a company. First, we observed the initial 
phase as well as the negotiation process. Subsequently, we described the typical 
interaction processes involved in target matchmaking and identified the specific risks of 
each process. Finally, we developed an improved matchmaking process. In the 
following, we describe the different steps of the content analysis in more detail. 
The first step includes a comprehensive range of information taken mainly from 
the web pages of companies as well as from other sources like the terms of conditions 
of problem-solving marketplaces and blogs; in some cases where the procedures were 
unclear we called the contact persons mentioned on these sites. For example, we studied 
the web pages of all DAX30 companies to identify all the possible ways to offer an idea 
from the perspective of an idea generator. 
  
Afterwards, we developed a category system based on theoretically-based 
definition criteria. The process of identifying the categories has to be done carefully and 
in steps. To do this, we used service blueprints (Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2000; 
Haksever, 2000). Originally, service blueprints were used to analyse services (in 
particular, activities by service providers and service customers). However, for our 
purposes we used blueprints to develop our categories for the analysis of the different 
interaction processes in business management (specifically, of the DAX30 companies). 
The blueprints consisted of the activities of both parties (in some cases, also third-party 
activities) broken down by the line of interaction between these activities as well as by 
the specific interfaces (technical realisation between the parties involved, e.g. internet 
platforms).  
In the analysis, we focused on the main trust-building activities of both parties in 
the matchmaking process and the interfaces between them. The identified categories 
were revised within feedback loops and reduced to key categories or deleted if they 
were deemed to be unreliable. In the end, we were able to differentiate five categories. 
To accomplish this, the different definitions, examples and coding rules for each 
category were developed. This coding system was the basis of our analysis (see Table 
1).  
Table 1. Coding. 
Category Definition Sub-Categories 
Activity (company) Action carried out by 
company 
 Problem identification 
 Review 
 Offer 
 Feedback 
Activity (idea 
contributor) 
Action carried out by idea 
contributor 
 Idea generation 
 Acceptance 
 IP right application 
 Request 
Activity (third 
party) 
Action carried out by third 
party 
 Providing online platform/problem 
solving marketplace 
 Providing rules for matching 
  
Order relation Order of activities  Request - feedback 
 Idea - review 
 Offer - acceptance 
 Review – offer 
 etc. 
Interfaces Realisation of links 
between activities of 
involved parties 
 Online platform 
 Personal relationship 
 Written agreement (confidentiality 
agreement) 
 
In the next step, we identified the main risks for the external idea contributor and 
the company with regard to the idea and property rights transfer for each matchmaking 
process. We compared the matchmaking processes by categorising the risks according 
to strategic and financial (operational) risks. In addition, we identified the typical 
deficiencies that arise when transferring ideas from an external idea contributor to a 
company. 
 Based on these findings, we developed an improved matchmaking process 
between the external idea contributor and the company by introducing a trustworthy 
intermediary to deal with the risks identified for both parties. This allows the external 
idea contributor and the company to establish a long-term collaborative relationship 
from which they can both benefit and that is based on both parties having found a 
suitable partner of strategic relevance.   
4.   Results of the qualitative content analysis 
In the first step, we identified five different matchmaking processes of transferring an 
idea from the external idea contributor to a company.  
The first way for an idea contributor to transfer an idea to a company is to send a 
speculative application (Figure 1). Companies often receive these requests from idea 
contributors. The quality of the answer given by the company depends on the defined 
processes within the enterprise. Usually, this process lacks transparency and for idea 
contributors the risk of receiving an incomplete or unqualified answer is high. The idea 
  
contributor has to accept the terms and conditions of the company after he submits the 
idea. Since companies do not have any proof of their own internal ideas, they run the 
risk of being accused of using an externally-acquired idea without permission even 
though they may have had the idea first. 
 
Figure 1: Matchmaking process ‘Speculative application (without IP rights)’. 
 
In the second matchmaking process, ‘Speculative application (with IP rights)’, 
the idea contributor holds a stronger position. Before offering the idea to companies, he 
claims intellectual property rights, such as patents or registered designs. The first 
problem that occurs in this situation has to do with the fact that not every idea fulfils the 
criteria for legal protection. For example, ideas for patents must be technical in nature. 
Also, the high costs associated with patent protection and the complicated application 
processes are prohibitive for many idea contributors. Therefore, in most cases the 
parties cannot enter into a strategic collaboration.    
 
Figure 2: Matchmaking process ‘Speculative application (with IP rights)’. 
 
Idea contributor
Company
idea
Review
Offer
(optional)
Acceptance
(optional)
1. Speculative application (without IP rights)
Characteristics:
• No defined rules
• Idea contributor usually has to accept terms & 
conditions of the company
• Idea contributor might be cheated by company or an 
employee of the company
• No transparency in the process, risk of unqualified answer
• Companies do not have any proof of their own internal 
ideas
Idea contributor
Company
IP right
Review
Offer
(optional)
Acceptance
(optional)
2. Speculative application (with IP rights)
Characteristics:
• Regulated by law (IP rights)
• High costs and time spent are a significant barrier
to patent protection.
• Protection is limited 
(e.g. patents in Germany are granted for a maximum
of 20 years)
• Idea has to be published
  
Another way to avoid the disadvantages of a speculative application is to ask 
companies for a confidentiality agreement before presenting the idea (Figure 3 ‘Two-
step approach with confidentiality agreement’). In this case, both partners try to ensure 
that there will be an atmosphere of fairness and honesty beforehand. The rules between 
the idea contributor and the company might have to be negotiated, which could present 
the first big challenge to collaborative innovations. After signing the agreement, the 
contributor presents his idea. In the second step, the idea is reviewed by the company 
and another round of negotiations on the terms of exploitation (within the framework of 
the prior agreement) starts. In practice, this type of matchmaking with individual idea 
contributors is an exception and often limited to professional partners because it 
requires a great deal of concession and some degree of effort for companies. 
Furthermore, companies do not have any proof of their own internal ideas which are 
identical to externally contributed ideas. In addition, there is very little transparency into 
the idea process of companies, which creates a considerable challenge for the external 
contributors.  
 
Figure 3: Matchmaking process ‘Two-step approach with confidentiality agreement’”. 
 
Many companies have introduced online platforms (Figure 4) in order to 
simplify the idea transfer process. For example, BMW has implemented the Virtual 
Innovation Agency and a Co-Creation Lab (www.bmwgroup.com). With online 
platforms, the rules are generally defined by the company in advance. Thus, an idea 
Characteristics:
• Rules are given by the company or negotiated between
the idea contributor and company
• The idea contributor might force the company to pay
for an idea which can not be used by the company
• Almost no transparency in the process
• Companies do not have any proof of their own internal 
ideas
3. Two-step approach with confidentiality agreement
Idea contributor
Company
idea
Feedback
Request
confidentiality 
agreement
Review
Offer
(optional)
Acceptance
(optional)
  
contributor usually has to accept these rules before using the platform. This implies that 
the transparency of the matchmaking process pretty much depends on the design of the 
platform. Generally, the matchmaking process is simplified by an open innovation 
platform. The idea contributor can present his idea on this platform; however he has to 
accept the rules beforehand. Usually, he transfers the idea rights completely to the 
company.  
Sometimes this matchmaking process can include innovative competitions, in 
which companies use internet platforms to collect new ideas within a certain period of 
time and offer incentives to idea contributors in the way of awards. However, the major 
disadvantages of the first three matchmaking processes are still not resolved. 
 
Figure 4: Matchmaking process ‘Company’s open innovation online platform’. 
 
Another popular way for idea contributors to transfer ideas to companies is to 
use external problem-solving marketplaces (Figure 5) that are managed by a third party, 
e.g. Innocentive (www.innocentive.com). These are platforms where companies can 
present their problems and ideas and solutions are provided by creative people. The 
advantage for companies is that they have access to a great number of potential idea 
contributors, which is extremely important in a competitive environment. Furthermore, 
platforms like this require little implementation effort and are cost efficient. However, 
we are still left with the problem that companies cannot provide proof of ideas that have 
already been submitted by external sources. It is important to point out that the idea 
Characteristics:
• Rules are defined by company; processes are simplified
• The idea contributor has to accept the terms and usually 
also the conditions as well
• Idea contributor might be cheated by the company or an 
employee of the company
• Transparency depends on the modality of the
implemented platform
• Companies do not have any proof of their internal ideas
4. Company‘s open innovation online platform
Idea contributor
Online
platform
Company
idea
Review
Offer
(optional)
Acceptance
(optional)
  
contributor and company have to accept the terms and conditions of the third-party 
platform organiser. 
 
Figure 5: Matchmaking process ‘Problem-solving marketplace’. 
 
In the second step, we identified the potential risks for the external idea 
contributor as well as for the company. Risks are usually conceptualised as the 
variances of outcomes that are of relevance to the risk-taking person (Cooper et al., 
2005). The perceived risk is different from uncertainty because it depends on the 
probabilities of different outcomes. Usually, risk is seen as negative (Das & Teng, 
2001). For a structural approach, we categorise risks into strategic (i.e. long-term) and 
financial (i.e. short-term) risks. However, this does not mean that strategic risks cannot 
also be financial risks, but rather that the strategic risks concern the performance of the 
individual or company (Das & Teng, 2001). Table 2 summarises all the risks identified 
in the matchmaking processes evaluated. 
Table 2: Risk analysis of matchmaking processes. 
Characteristics:
• Rules are given by the problem solving market place
• Company and idea contributor have to accept the terms 
of the problem-solving marketplace
• Company might set conditions
• Companies do not have any proof of their own internal 
ideas
5. Problem-solving marketplace
Idea contributor
Online
platform
Company
idea
problem solving 
marketplace
problem
Offer
(optional)
Acceptance
(optional)
Match
  
 
Idea contributors are in a strong position because they own the property rights to 
their ideas. However, the high fees and complicated application procedures associated 
with filing patents as well as the prospect of having to publish the idea is often a 
deterrent to initiating this process. All matchmaking processes have financial and 
strategic risks, especially because contributors usually do not have sufficient evidence 
that they are the author of their ideas. Without concrete proof of authorship, 
matchmaking processes like speculative application and the two-step approach with a 
confidentiality agreement, contributors are taking the financial risk of not being 
adequately compensated or of not receiving any payment at all. In addition, they run the 
risk that their idea will be misused. Therefore, from the standpoint of an idea 
contributor, an intermediary concept might be a welcome solution in certain situations. 
1.
 S
p
ec
u
la
ti
ve
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
 
(w
it
h
o
u
t 
IP
 r
ig
h
ts
)
2.
 S
p
ec
u
la
ti
ve
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
(w
it
h
 IP
 r
ig
h
ts
)
3.
 T
w
o
-s
te
p
 a
p
p
ro
ac
h
 w
it
h
 
co
n
fi
d
en
ti
al
it
y 
ag
re
em
en
t
4.
 C
o
m
p
an
y'
s 
o
p
en
 in
n
o
va
ti
o
n
 
o
n
lin
e 
p
la
tf
o
rm
5.
 P
ro
b
le
m
-s
o
lv
in
g 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
6.
 In
n
o
va
ti
o
n
 in
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
Risks of idea contributor
Financial risks
Idea transfer without compensation 4 1 2 3 2 1
Idea transfer with too little compensation 4 1 3 3 2 1
Wasted costs/fees and effort 3 4 3 1 1 1
Strategic risks
No proof for idea contributor's origin 4 1 3 3 2 1
Idea gets published 2 4 2 2 2 1
No control over misuse (the company or an employee 
of the company might steal the idea) 4 1 4 3 3 2
Risks of company
Financial risks
High aquisition cost per idea 1 1 4 4 2 2
Superfluous payments (no proof for own internal ideas) 3 1 4 4 4 1
Company has to pay too much for the idea 3 3 4 4 4 1
Strategic risks 4
Too few (good) ideas caused by a lack of trust 4 1 3 3 3 1 3
Too few (good) ideas caused by high barriers 1 4 2 1 1 1 2
Slow idea transfer processes 2 4 4 2 2 3 1
Loss of (good) ideas due to unstructured processes 4 4 3 1 1 1
Too little contact to potential idea contributors 3 4 3 3 1 2
Legend
Very high risk
High risk
Low risk
Very low risk
  
In matchmaking processes like the ‘two-step approach’ and ‘online platform’, 
companies can define the rules; however, they also have high acquisition costs and the 
risk of superfluous payments. They are generally in a strong position if they receive 
speculative applications or applications via online platforms or problem-solving 
marketplaces; nevertheless they are still exposed to the strategic risk of losing ideas in 
these situations. In order to receive valuable ideas it is in their interest to come together 
with idea contributors as equals. A key issue here is being able to trace the origin of an 
idea. Only with trust supporting mechanisms can a continuous flow of good external 
ideas be assured. Therefore, the intermediary concept is a tool that could also be of 
interest to companies. 
5.   Trust-based innovation intermediary  
Based on our findings, we developed a trust-based intermediary model that allows 
companies and external idea contributors to profit from the transfer of ideas. Our model 
addresses the risks identified in our analysis of all five matchmaking processes. This 
model is described as follows:  
In the first step, the idea contributor contacts an intermediary between the idea 
contributor and the target company which can be an agency or an organisation. The idea 
contributor reports the idea to the intermediary so that the intermediary can identify a 
target area for it. In the second step, the intermediary contacts the target company. If the 
company is interested in the idea in the identified target area, the intermediary asks for a 
complete list of ideas in that specific technological field. In this case, the company 
compiles a list of all the ideas in that field. In the third step, the company’s list is 
submitted to the intermediary so that it can determine if the company is familiar with 
the same or a similar idea. In the fourth step, the intermediary informs both parties of 
the result. Two options are possible in the event of an already existing idea: 1. The 
  
matter is not pursued by either party.  2. If the idea is new for the company, both parties 
have to agree on the terms for submitting the idea. After submission, the company 
might still have the option of buying the idea. Even in the case of a denial, the company 
might compensate the contributor for his efforts with a small sum. 
Assuming that the intermediary is really acting independently and is trustworthy, 
we have an idea process that meets the requirements of the idea contributor and the 
company. In this case, we can say that we have a successful matchmaking process and 
no longer have a social dilemma: The idea contributor can propose an idea without 
publishing or submitting it before making sure that the company is interested and the 
intermediary has reviewed the newness of the idea. Thus, in terms of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, at this stage we can say that the idea contributor (as one party of the game) 
can be sure he is not being cheated by the company. He can trust the intermediary as an 
independent agency or organisation in the knowledge transfer process. In the event of 
misuse, the idea contributor has evidence that the idea is his, which is also supported by 
the trust-based intermediary. In addition, the company benefits from the structured 
matching process and also has proof that the idea already exists. Thus, the other party 
can also be sure that the idea contributor is not cheating. In the long run, this impartial 
setting helps to maintain a positive image and ensure a continuous flow of ideas to the 
company. Therefore, we can say that the social dilemma can be transferred in a 
successful matchmaking process by including a trust-based intermediary in the ‘game’. 
Finally, the company not only profits from this idea transfer process in the short term by 
generating substantial revenue from a single idea, but also in the long term through its 
positive reputation, thereby ensuring that more idea contributors will want to work with 
them. This shows that the trust-based intermediary model is a strategic model that 
  
translates into profits for the company in the future and safeguards their existence in a 
competitive market.  
 
Figure 6: Matchmaking process in the trust-based intermediary model. 
6.  Implications for research and business management  
Based on our findings, we see two main implications for innovation research. First, our 
findings demonstrate that the literature on the role of intermediaries in innovation 
management strongly contributes to overcoming the challenges in the matchmaking 
process between an external idea contributor and a company. A successful 
matchmaking process depends on several social factors, such as the competence, 
fairness and integrity of the intermediary. These abilities are often mentioned in the 
trust research literature (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995). Thus, this paper combines the findings 
found in the literature on intermediaries in the innovation management field with the 
findings in the trust literature. While the importance of trust is already well-known in 
other high-risk contexts, such as in building long-term relationships on the internet 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994; McKnight et al., 2002), there is only little knowledge about 
the support of a trust-based intermediary model in the matchmaking process for 
innovation partnerships.  
Second, our findings contribute to the field of innovation management in general 
because we integrate trust in the matchmaking process. Trust in the innovation 
Characteristics:
• The rules are defined by the mediator
• The idea is protected by the mediator
• Companies do have a proof of their own internal 
ideas
6. Innovation intermediary
Idea contributor
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management field is still very rare; however, further research is needed because we 
think that the innovation management field can contribute a great deal to the findings 
from the existing trust research (e.g. Nienaber and Schewe, forthcoming).  
With regard to the business management side, we see the following implications 
for idea contributors as well as for companies. 
 For idea contributors, the trust-based model generates reliability within the 
matchmaking process. The idea contributor can trust the intermediary and is therefore 
able to give the intermediary the needed and usually sensitive information about his 
idea. In addition, the intermediary is able to act as a witness if the idea is misused by the 
company. Thus, the intermediary supports the idea contributor by reducing his risk 
when transferring and thus, explicating his idea to the other party.  Furthermore, he can 
be sure that he will receive compensation if the idea is unknown but useful for the 
company. Finally, the idea contributor does not have to publish his idea through a patent 
application process which not only takes very long but is also very costly and makes the 
idea public.       
With regard to the management of companies we see the following business 
implications in relation to attracting external idea contributors and profiting from their 
ideas. On the one hand, we show companies how they can profit from external 
knowledge without being afraid of being accused of intellectual property theft. In this 
case, the intermediary works as a third party acting as a witness. On the other hand, the 
trust perspective of the matchmaking process allows sustainable idea collection and 
transfer processes to be developed. When idea contributors trust the intermediary, they 
are willing to suggest more and better quality ideas. Therefore, open innovation oriented 
companies need the services of intermediaries to overcome the barriers mentioned 
above.  
  
Furthermore, we believe that the trust-based intermediary model might also be 
an interesting concept or business case for start-ups and/or service providers. Their 
trustworthy service could have advantages for both idea contributors and companies. 
7.   Conclusion and future research 
Our results demonstrate two main contributions: First, we analysed the different 
processes involved when external idea contributors offer their ideas to companies. We 
structured the potential risks for idea contributors and companies with respect to 
benefiting from an external idea. By doing this, we were able to identify that what both 
research and business are lacking is the capability of building a sustainable and efficient 
relationship for both partners. Second, we developed a theoretical model called the 
trust-based intermediary model on the basis of our findings, which allows efficient 
matchmaking between both partners. The intermediary makes it possible for the idea 
contributor to make sure that the company is not lying about its knowledge of a 
submitted idea. Thus, the idea contributor knows that the company is behaving honestly 
and fairly and is therefore motivated to submit his latest ideas. At the same time, the 
company is no longer afraid of developing a negative reputation and is able to profit 
from good external ideas for a long time. 
Thus, our results seem to be a good basis or starting point for further research – 
especially in combining the findings of the existing innovation management research 
with the relatively new field of trust research. In this respect, we can contribute to the 
field of innovation management by developing a new model of idea exchange which 
demonstrates how both parties can profit from each other in a practical way without the 
typical risks associated with collaboration. Trust seems to be very important in such 
knowledge transfer processes, therefore establishing this kind of positive atmosphere 
might be a possible solution in dealing with the problems of social dilemmas. Thus, our 
  
contribution can also be applied to the findings of trust research in this area. An 
empirical study or several case studies might be the next step to prove our theoretical 
model and to give companies concrete business recommendations.  From our point of 
view, it is especially interesting to evaluate the way that intermediaries work, what kind 
of tools they use and what kind of internal organisations they choose.  
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